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Abstract
Lamenting the lack of public awareness of international events and U.S. foreign policy is not a
particularly novel exercise; yet, explaining the process by which issues enter and exit the public realm
remains a challenging endeavor. Despite contributions from researchers working in international
relations and mass communication, explaining public inattentiveness continues to vex scholars.
However, in his article, "Up and Down with Ecology: The 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" Anthony Downs
provides a parsimonious and tractable model of public opinion that can be applied to foreign policy
issues.1 While Downs concerns himself exclusively with domestic issues, particularly environmental
issues, his model has thepotential to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the
public and policymakers over critical issues such as international terrorism. With minor
modifications, the model has the potential to explain public support for failed foreign policies as well.
Downs' model, when applied to international terrorism, explains why policymakers seek simple
solutions, why the public supports such solutions, and why the media fail to provide meaningful
coverage of intractable issues such as international terrorism. Before discussing Downs' model, the
basic tenets and shortcomings of some of the more prevalent theories of the relationship between
public opinion and foreign policy are discussed below.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/11
Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention 
Cycle: International Terrorism and 
U.S. Public Opinion
By Karen K. Petersen
Introduction
Lamenting the lack of public awareness of international events and U.S. 
foreign policy is not a particularly novel exercise; yet, explaining the pro-
cess by which issues enter and exit the public realm remains a challenging 
endeavor. Despite contributions from researchers working in interna-
tional relations and mass communication, explaining public inattentive-
ness continues to vex scholars. However, in his article, "Up and Down 
with Ecology: The 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" Anthony Downs provides a 
parsimonious and tractable model of public opinion that can be applied to 
foreign policy issues.1 While Downs concerns himself exclusively with 
domestic issues, particularly environmental issues, his model has the 
potential to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between 
the public and policymakers over critical issues such as international ter-
rorism. With minor modifications, the model has the potential to explain 
public support for failed foreign policies as well. Downs' model, when 
applied to international terrorism, explains why policymakers seek simple 
solutions, why the public supports such solutions, and why the media fail 
to provide meaningful coverage of intractable issues such as international 
terrorism. Before discussing Downs' model, the basic tenets and short-
comings of some of the more prevalent theories of the relationship 
between public opinion and foreign policy are discussed below.
The Relationship between Public Opinion and 
Foreign Policy
Framing, or presenting issues in such a way as to influence the emotive 
reaction, fits within the realm of elite-driven public opinion theory. 
Robert Entman discusses framing as an interactive process he labels 
"cascading network activation."2 Cascading reflects the interactive 
process whereby information flows from the top (administration) through 
the middle (media) to the bottom (public) with limited interplay up the 
"waterfall." According to Entman, all actors in the cascade model behave 
as "cognitive misers" who seek to "satisfice" rather than articulate fully 
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the details of a given issue.3 For issues that are congruent with existing 
perceptions (at all levels), the process of framing is readily achieved and 
accepted. For example, responding to a major attack (such as September 
11), fits the parameters of the existing framework that dictates that the 
responsibility for protecting the United States belongs with the 
commander-in-chief and that the citizens of the United States were 
undeserving of such an attack. However, when issues do not fit pre-
existing notions, generating a smooth process of information 
dissemination becomes more difficult, as we see in the period prior to the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Entman does have a role for citizens to direct information up the hierar-
chy; rather, the media act as a go-between for citizen framing. Unfortu-
nately, citizen response to foreign policy events, an issue which has been 
perplexing public opinion scholars for decades, does not always follow a 
logical progression. The Converse-McGuire Model explains citizen prefer-
ences as non-monotonic due to variations in the probability of reception 
and acceptance: citizens who are moderately aware (receptive) and mod-
erately partisan (acceptant to change) are most malleable for typical 
events, and the less aware are more malleable for high-intensity mes-
sages.4 Zaller's inclusion of the intensity of the message (based on Brody5) 
moves us towards considering that not all foreign policy issues should be 
treated as equal and even different stages in the same issue receive differ-
ent levels of attention.
One of the most successful models challenging the assumption that for-
eign policy is an elite realm comes from communications scholarship on 
the influence the media bring to bear on foreign policy agendas, particu-
larly the process by which agendas are constructed or influenced. Thomas 
Birkland defines an agenda as "a collection of the elements of public prob-
lems to which at least some of the public and governmental officials are 
actively attentive."6 Agendas range from concrete policy proposals to 
beliefs, and exist at all levels of government and society.7 Agenda setting 
is the process whereby actors attempt to get issues on or keep issues off 
the agenda, or attempt to control the content of the agenda. The role of 
the media in setting the agenda can best be described as a process (inten-
tional or otherwise) whereby "through their day-by-day selection and dis-
play of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and 
influence our perceptions of what are the most important [salient] news 
events of the day."8 The media influence "the salience of an issue, an 
influence on whether any significant people really regard it as worthwhile 
to hold an opinion about that issue."9 As evidence of the important role of 
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the media in the agenda-setting function, Maxwell McCombs discusses 
numerous instances in his book in which the media created a sensation of 
fear over issues that were actually improving rather than worsening.10
In contrast to the above schools of thought, Downs provides a model 
explaining the level of attention to an issue that allows the salience of 
events to drive the public reaction rather than relying only on elites or the 
media (as the framing and agenda-setting models do, respectively). 
Instead of viewing the media as the agenda-setting force, Downs posits 
that events drive public interest and that public interest determines 
media coverage. The model developed by Downs, while focused exclu-
sively on environmental issues, appears to fit other critical issues, includ-
ing international terrorism. After describing the issue-attention cycle 
below and discussing the applicability of each component to the issue of 
international terrorism and U.S. public opinion, a modification of Downs' 
model is offered and the potential implications for U.S. policy are dis-
cussed.
The Five Attributes of the Issue-Attention Cycle
While Downs' issue-attention cycle has received widespread attention in 
domestic politics, there is no reason to assume that the relative dearth of 
attention in international relations and/or foreign policy research means 
that the cycle is inapplicable to those areas. For example, Christopher 
Bellavita finds that homeland security issues do tend to follow the issue-
attention cycle,11 and Michael C. Hall finds that the stages of the issue-
attention cycle "well describe" travel safety policies and public opinion of 
travel safety measures in the wake of September 11.12 Extending Downs' 
model beyond the water's edge, while uncommon, does not lack 
precedent.
The five stages of the issue-attention cycle—pre-problem, alarmed discov-
ery and euphoric enthusiasm, realizing the cost, gradual decline of intense 
public interest, and post-problem—all fit the issue of international terror-
ism. Each of these five stages and evidence of the analytical leverage of the 
model based on applicability of each stage to the issue of international 
terrorism is discussed below.
The Pre-Problem Stage
The pre-problem stage "prevails when some highly undesirable social 
condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention, even 
though some experts or interest groups may already be alarmed by it."13 
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Clearly, international terrorism was a problem for numerous other states 
and for the U.S. prior to 2001 (at least since the 1983 bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut). In public testimony before the September 11 Com-
mission, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated:
The terrorist threat to our nation did not emerge on September 
11, 2001. Long before that day, radical, freedom-hating terrorists 
declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on 
the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the hijacking of the 
Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the 
World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American installa-
tions in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the East Africa embassy 
bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, these and 
other atrocities were part of a sustained, systematic campaign to 
spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans. 
The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with 
them. For more than twenty years, the terrorist threat gathered, 
and America's response across several administrations of both 
parties was insufficient.14
While Rice meets the criteria of "expert," she presents a post-hoc analysis 
of the threat. The pre-problem stage is also supported by an analysis of 
news coverage of terrorism in two of the nation's leading periodicals. 
Mathew Storin finds that while several high quality, in-depth stories on 
the threat of international terrorism had been published (even one in the 
months prior to September 11), articles addressing the issue of interna-
tional terrorism accounted for only slightly more than 1 percent of the 
total articles he reviewed.15 However, during the period prior to the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, "a large body of work concerning terrorism was being 
compiled in the academic community,"16 indicating an elite interest prior 
to the September 11 attacks consistent with the pre-problem stage of 
Downs' model.
Additionally, policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches 
of the U.S. Federal Government left a paper trail of evidence relating to 
their concerns over international terrorism that dated back at least to 
Alexander Haig's announcement that opposition to terrorism would 
replace the Carter administration's focus on the advancement of human 
rights, an announcement that included discussions of al-Qaida and 
Usama bin Ladin.17 As described by Downs, the pre-problem stage fits 
public and elite perceptions of international terrorism prior to September 
11, 2001, an event which propelled the issue of terrorism into stage two, 
the "alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm" stage.18
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Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm
Movement into the second stage occurs abruptly, according to Downs. "As 
a result of some dramatic series of events . . . the public suddenly becomes 
both aware of and alarmed about the evils of a particular problem."19 
Despite the fact that the attack of September 11 was not the first attack on 
the United States or the World Trade Center, it was the first attack that 
was sufficient in scale to generate awareness and alarm in the public 
realm and among policymakers. The United States immediately mobilized 
for a "War on Terror" with all of the zeal predicted by Downs' model. Nine 
days after the attacks of September 11, President Bush addressed Con-
gress and the global community offering the following rally cry: "Our war 
on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated."20 Three years later, 70 percent of respondents to a Cornell Uni-
versity survey responded somewhat or strongly favorably to the U.S. War 
on Terror, which, presumably, included Iraq by this time.21
Alarmed discovery and euphoria certainly seem to characterize the period 
after September 11. Eventually, however, public opinion about the War on 
Terror, propelled by an increasingly complex situation in Iraq and the 
deterioration of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, began to turn 
against the war and the administration. Pew surveys demonstrated a pre-
cipitous decline in the public's confidence in the government's ability to 
protect citizens from further attacks, from 48 percent immediately after 
September 11 to 17 percent only four years later.22 Downs predicts a vari-
ety of disenchantments and explains their possible sources in the third 
stage of his cycle.
Realization of the Costs
The third stage in Downs' model, a gradual realization of the high costs of 
significant progress, includes awareness that "part of the problem results 
from arrangements that are providing significant benefits to someone—
often to millions."23 Intellectuals have debated the relationship between 
terrorism and various components of Western culture and foreign policy 
at length; however, the public discussion of culpability is far less well 
developed. This is, perhaps, the point at which the assumption that "the 
asymmetry between what leaders know and what the public knows" is a 
significant modifying factor when considering the role of public prefer-
ences in foreign policy arenas.24 One could frame this as an asymmetry of 
intellectual training as opposed to simple asymmetry of knowledge. Prac-
tically speaking, the third stage involves the realization of the high costs 
and the low probability of success. In the case of the United States' over-
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seas contingency operations, the public perception centers on the flawed 
strategy rather than a flawed paradigm. Nonetheless, public support for 
funding the Iraq war began to wane even before the depth of the current 
economic crisis became apparent, demonstrating that at a minimum the 
public understood the costs.
Decline in Intensity of Interest
A key part of the third stage—the increasing recognition that the relation-
ship between the problem and its solution requires inordinate sacrifice—
leads to the fourth stage, a gradual decline in intense public interest.25 As 
Downs notes, "The previous stage becomes almost imperceptibly trans-
formed into the fourth stage . . . As more and more people realize how dif-
ficult, and how costly to themselves, a solution to the problem would be . . 
. ."26 Boredom, discouragement, and suppression of thoughts (or some 
combination thereof) causes the issue to wane and attention to shift to 
other issues that are now entering stage two.27 Birkland provides evi-
dence of the movement of the issue of international terrorism from stage 
three to stage four.28 He finds that New York Times coverage of terrorism 
during the first quarter of 2002 was 60 percent less than the rate of cover-
age in the fourth quarter of 2001. By the fourth quarter of 2002, the rate 
of coverage had dropped by 80 percent, suggesting that movement into 
stage four began to occur shortly after the initial event (September 11).29
Post-Problem Stage
The fifth and final stage, the post-problem stage, is referred to as a "twi-
light realm of lesser attention," but it is distinct from the pre-problem 
stage in that the presence of new institutions and bureaucracies continue 
to impact policy and allow for a higher level of attention than issues in the 
pre-problem stage.30 Of course, Homeland Security is now fulfilling the 
role of a new bureaucracy and is likely to continue to do so for decades to 
come. While we may not have entered fully into the post-problem stage 
yet, it is likely that we will when the Iraq campaign ends (and in the 
absence of another major attack on the U.S.), and it is possible that we 
will remain there indefinitely. Figure 1 represents the stages of Downs' 
issue-attention cycle as originally conceived.
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Figure 1: Downs' Issue-Attention cycle
Issues Prone to the Issue-Attention Cycle
Of course, Downs readily acknowledges that not all problems will go 
through the issue-attention cycle and posits that three specific 
characteristics increase the likelihood an issue will move through the 
cycle.31 According to Downs, "First, the majority of persons in society are 
not suffering from the problem nearly as much as some minority (a 
numerical minority, not necessarily an ethnic one)."32 Clearly, if one were 
to equate suffering with being a victim of international terrorism directly 
or even indirectly, then international terrorism meets criteria one. 
Second, the problem itself can be attributed to "social arrangements that 
provide significant benefits to a majority or a powerful minority of the 
population."33 Academic discussions of international terrorism, 
particularly after September 11, tend to be framed in terms of "root 
causes," which often point to large-scale social problems like global 
poverty that have roots in social and economic arrangements that benefit 
the global north or the West. Other justifications for international terror 
attacks on the United States include the U.S. military presence in Saudi 
Arabia, which traditionally secured access to key resources through our 
allies thus benefiting a majority of the U.S. population as well as the 
powerful, elite military-industrial complex. The final attribute of an issue 
Petersen: Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009Journal of Strategic Security
8
prone to the issue-attention cycle is that "the problem has no intrinsically 
exciting qualities—or no longer has them."34 While international 
terrorism excites academics, the lack of attacks on U.S. interests means 
that sustained public interest is unlikely. After all, the public paid little 
attention to the issue of international terrorism prior to September 11, 
2001, and no longer considers Afghanistan or Iraq to be the biggest 
threats to U.S. security.35
According to Downs, "when all three of the above conditions exist 
concerning a given problem that has somehow captured the public 
attention, the odds are great that it will soon move through the entire 
'issue-attention cycle'—and therefore will gradually fade from the center 
of the stage."36 This linear process occurs because condition one means 
that the majority of the population is not suffering and therefore will not 
be continually reminded of the problem. The second condition means that 
significant changes that would cause either social upheaval or painful 
concessions from the powerful (or both) would be required to solve the 
problem. And the third condition means that any attempt by the media to 
sustain the attention of the public would undermine profit, thus giving the 
media incentive to find a new, more exciting, or entertaining issue to 
pursue.37
International Terrorism, the U.S. Media, and the 
Issue-Attention Model
Empirically, Downs' model predicts patterns of media coverage of inter-
national terrorism whereby we would expect to see very little attention 
devoted to the issue prior to 2001, which is exactly what Storin38 finds as 
shown in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Stories on International Terrorism 
Additionally, we would expect that media coverage would be high for a 
period following 2001, but that the frequency would wane as the issue 
moves from stage two to stage three or four.39 Consistent with that expec-
tation, coverage is reduced significantly through 2007. Figure 2 indicates 
a steady downward trend in the frequency of stories related to interna-
tional terrorism appearing in the New York Times from 2001–2007.40 
This downward slope is punctuated by spikes that correspond to the 
attacks in Madrid and London, but overall the trend holds. International 
terrorism appears to conform to the issue-attention cycle theoretically (as 
described in the preceding sections) and empirically with respect to media 
coverage.
While the issue of international terrorism conforms to the model as pre-
sented by Downs, one minor modification may increase the usefulness of 
the model without undermining parsimony. The modification and its 
potential impact are discussed below along with policy implications of 
foreign policy issues that conform to Downs' model.
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Modifications of the Issue-Attention Cycle
Downs provides a parsimonious, elegant explanation of a problem that 
vexes researchers—the inability of the American public to focus consistent 
attention on important policy issues. As such, the issue-attention cycle 
has excellent potential in the realm of foreign policy analysis. As a 
"thought experiment," a minor modification to stage three is offered along 
with speculation as to how the modification would alter the overall 
model.41 Stage three (realization of the costs) is modified to include 
"asymmetry of understanding" rather than asymmetry of information. 
Clearly, policymakers (particularly at the highest levels of authority) will 
have access to information that is not available to the media and the pub-
lic. While disparity in information access could create divergent issue 
positions, difference in access to information need not lead the public to 
become disinterested in an issue once it enters the issue-attention cycle. 
Now that interested individuals, at least in developed countries, have 
access to multiple media sources and more information than ever, the 
potential for the average person as well as for journalists to research 
issues is much greater than it ever has been. If anything, this new wealth 
of information should increase the probability that a given issue will 
attract public attention. This does not appear to be the case and can be 
explained with reference to asymmetry of understanding rather than 
asymmetry of information.
The purpose here is not to expound on why people might pay less atten-
tion that ever before (something Downs lamented thirty-seven years 
ago42), rather I want to explain why an asymmetry of understanding 
might be important to the issue-attention cycle and other research on 
public opinion and foreign policy. Generally speaking, we are not doing a 
very good job educating people about international issues from elemen-
tary education through college. A 2007 Pew Research Center survey finds 
that "despite the fact that education levels have risen dramatically over 
the past 20 years, public knowledge has not increased accordingly."43 The 
U.S. public remains woefully uninformed about history, geography, and 
other basic subjects pertinent to understanding international relations.44 
The significance of this lack of understanding to the issue-attention cycle 
is apparent in stage three where Downs predicts that a gradual realization 
of the high costs of success will occur along with the realization that the 
policies that lead to the problem benefit society (a majority or powerful 
minority), thus leading people to become less interested in the problem in 
general.45 
While there have been debates about international terrorism and its com-
plexities, they tend to be either isolated to academic discussions or part of 
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over-the-top conspiracy-theorist weblogs, infrequently reaching the 
mainstream media. Due to a lack of understanding of the complexities of 
international terrorism, public perception of international terrorism in 
the U.S. may have cycled into the fourth stage without ever being affected 
by stage three. Evidence of this can be seen in survey research showing 
that almost half of the public remains optimistic about our chances of 
winning the War on Terror.46 A reserve of optimism regarding the ability 
to win the War on Terror exists within the United States public/electorate 
due in part to the public's lack of awareness of the role of geopolitical and 
international economic factors that seem to provide motivation or at least 
a semblance of justification for those engaged in international terrorism. 
Perhaps optimism regarding the War on Terror is a coping mechanism, or 
it could reflect that the public lacks depth of understanding of the com-
plexities associated with the causes of terrorism and its use as a political 
tool. While this may be a good thing for advocates of the war on terror, it 
does not bode well for our democracy. In addition to complicating the 
issue-attention cycle, such asymmetry of understanding allows policy-
makers to sell overly simplistic renditions of complex policy without the 
requisite accountability necessary to ensure the people continue to check 
the power of those who make such decisions.
Because the public lacks the will or ability to process the complex issue of 
international terrorism, the issue-attention cycle is disrupted in a funda-
mental way. Due to a failure to understand the complexity of international 
terrorism, the issue could become mired in a process whereby it cycles 
through stages two (alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm) through 
four (decline in interest) rather than progress linearly into the final stage 
of a twilight realm where only the bureaucracy remains. The insufficiency 
of education about international relations in the U.S. contributes to the 
recycling of the issue because the public lacks the intellectual training to 
process the information that would complete the third stage (realization 
of the costs), particularly the attributes of the problem that benefit the few 
at the expense of the many. Any significant event (akin to an event that 
would precipitate the creation of an issue-attention cycle) could propel 
the issue back to stage two, as indicated in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: Modified Issue-Attention Cycle
With the change to stage three described above, the issue of international 
terrorism could continue to cycle through the core of the model indefi-
nitely rather than entering the post-problem stage of lesser importance. 
Perhaps such a cyclical pattern could be positive? By keeping the issue 
alive, we could eventually create a constituency that develops enough 
sophistication to realize fully stage three thereby actually pressing policy-
makers to address international terrorism with more attention to detail 
rather than simply as a military operation. However, if such a change does 
not occur, the recycling of the issue could amount to carte blanche 
approval of failed policies, and not just failed policies either, but danger-
ous and expensive failed policies.
Policy Implications of the Issue-Attention Cycle
Attempts to understand the relationship between public opinion and for-
eign policy have occupied academics for decades. If foreign policy consti-
tutes the "high politics" of the elite, then why are we so concerned with 
untangling this complex relationship? First, the foundation of democracy, 
at least theoretically, is the public, which means that understanding pub-
lic opinion is both fundamentally important and politically astute. Sec-
ond, reputation matters in international relations. Public support for 
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democratic policies sends signals to allies and adversaries alike (as does 
opposition to policy). The strength of public support can provide leverage 
in international negotiations whether that support is based on thoughtful 
consideration or otherwise.47
If the issue-attention cycle (including the modification above) describes 
U.S. public attention to international terrorism, then we should expect 
that policymakers who attempt to deal with issues of international terror-
ism, in any way that addresses the nuances of cause and effect, will 
encounter little public support. Generally, the public should favor strate-
gies that appear to be quick and painless even if such strategies are coun-
terproductive. Eliminating the asymmetry of information may be the only 
useful strategy for moving the issue of international terrorism out of the 
issue-attention cycle. If the cycle can be disrupted, then perhaps the core 
problem can be addressed. Revisiting the issue that Downs first analyzed 
offers a glimmer of hope. Downs analysis focused on environmental 
issues and we have seen a re-awakening of at least one key environmental 
issue that fits the issue-attention model perfectly—global warming. 
Attempts to educate the public about the root causes and changes in 
behavior to combat global warming appear to be enjoying some initial 
success. "One series of surveys show that the 'personal importance' of glo-
bal warming has increased considerably over the past decade, with the 
proportion of Americans who say that global warming is either personally 
'extremely important' or 'very important' shifting from 27 percent in 1997 
to 52 percent in 2007."48 There appears to be growing support for policies 
that deal with global warming even at a significant cost to the public.
While education about environmental issues has begun to shift public 
opinion and, possibly, public policy, we cannot assume a similar trajec-
tory with respect to international terrorism or other key foreign policy 
issues. Only if sustained public attention to the issue leads to more depth 
of understanding can we expect the public to push for more nuanced 
(even more costly) policies to address the issue of international terrorism. 
Until that time, public opinion and international terrorism policy will 
continue to demonstrate consistency with Downs' model and policymak-
ers will continue to pursue policies that advocate easy solutions to com-
plex problems in an effort to maintain the support of the electorate.
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